This paper focuses on relative equity issue costs at commercial bank-affiliated and investment bank underwriters over the period 1995-99. We estimate models for the gross spreads associated with both IPOs and SEOs, but disaggregate the sample by type of underwriter. Our methods are driven by theoretical arguments that bank-related underwriters could have certain competitive advantages relative to investment banks in securities underwriting. We find some distinctive differences among the factors influencing gross spreads at the commercial bank-affiliated underwriters relative to investment banks, primarily in the set of variables we identify with the certification role of underwriters. The IPO gross spreads at Section 20 underwriters are less sensitive to scale economies, reputation, uncertainty, third-party monitoring, and pricing performance. The differences are consistent with theories that suggest that commercial bank organizations possess unique technologies for managing information and/or that Section 20 firms can exploit diversification benefits from BHC affiliation. This interpretation is strengthened by the lack of significant differences in SEO underwriter spreads. The relative advantage that Section 20s possess in monitoring capabilities or technologies for managing information problems appear to be irrelevant when information is readily and cheaply available. The observed results are also consistent with Hansen's (2000) argument that underwriters compete for business on several different dimensions.
Introduction
Commercial-banking organizations were prohibited from underwriting equity issues by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 . In 1990 reinterpreted the Act and permitted qualifying subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs) to enter the equity underwriting market. From 1990-96, the volume of equity underwriting by BHC subsidiaries (known as Section 20 subsidiaries) was severely curtailed by a Fed-imposed limit on total revenues from underwriting "ineligible" securities.
1 Effective in the first quarter on 1997, the Fed increased the revenue ceiling on Section 20 underwritings to 25%, and equity underwriting activities by Section 20 subsidiaries soon became a significant part of the market. Table 1 provides a list of the Section 20s with equity underwriting powers as of December 13,1999. Table 1 about here Initially, the Federal Reserve established certain "firewalls" to curb the sharing of information and resources between the commercial bank and underwriting components of a bank 1 In 1986, the Fed permitted securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in bank ineligible securities provided that underwriting revenues were less than 5% of the subsidiaries' gross revenues. The initial ineligible securities consisted of commercial paper, mortgage and other asset-backed securities, and revenue bonds. In 1989, the Fed increased the revenue ceiling on ineligible security underwriting to 10% and added corporate bonds to the list of ineligible securities. In 1990, the Fed added equity securities to the list of ineligible securities.
holding company. Effective in the first quarter of 1997, the Fed substantially relaxed these restrictions and permitted increased sharing of informational and managerial resources and eased restrictions on transactions between affiliates within a bank holding company that owned a Section 20 subsidiary. Since commercial banks have recognized expertise as information specialists [Rajan (1992) ] and monitors [Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) ], the underwriting affiliate in a bank holding company may be able to enjoy some positive spillovers that would be reflected in their debt and equity underwriting behavior.
Section 20s received debt-underwriting powers somewhat earlier than equity powers and became significant actors in that market by the mid-to-late 1990s [see Roten and Mullineaux (2000) ]. Consequently, research on BHC-related underwriting to date has largely focused on this sector of the market. Gande et al. (1997) find that Section 20 firms obtain a higher debt price (lower yield) for lower credit quality firms, which they interpret as evidence of a "net certification effect" for commercial bank-related underwriters. Gande et al. (1999) find that BHC entry decreased concentration in the debt market and that gross spreads and yield spreads consequently declined significantly, especially for lower-rated and smaller debt issues. Roten and Mullineaux (2000) find that gross spreads are significantly lower on debt underwritings by Section 20 affiliates over the period 1995-98, but that yields do not differ across underwriter types over the same period. Gande et al. (1999) briefly examine equity underwriting in their analysis of commercial bank entry into corporate security underwriting. They find no support for the hypothesis that increasing in Section 20 market share contributes to a decrease in equity underwriting spreads over the 1985-96 period.
BHC securities' underwriting is no longer proscribed by legislation. President Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act on November 12, 1999, effectively repealing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The general consensus among researchers is that the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act was misguided [see Krozner and Rajan (1997) and Benston (1990) ], which is consistent with the Federal Reserve's decisions to allow limited underwriting activities by BHC subsidiaries.
In this paper, we address the following questions: Are there significant differences in underwriter compensation on equity issues underwritten by Section 20 firms and investment banks? Do different factors influence gross spreads for the two types of underwriters? If so, can these be rationalized by finance theory? We rely on a framework developed by Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) to analyze gross spreads on IPOs and seasoned equity issues. In particular, their model identifies three distinct services provided by underwriters: certification, marketing, and monitoring. A byproduct of our research is a somewhat more extensive analysis of the determinants of gross spreads than has appeared in the literature to date.
We find that gross spreads on IPOs and SEOs do not differ, on average, between the two types of underwriters over our sample period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . 2 There are some significant differences between Section 20 underwriters and investment banks, however, in the factors that determine IPO gross spreads. In particular, underwriting costs at commercial bank-affiliated firms are less sensitive to reputation, uncertainty, third-party monitoring, and pricing performance. Scale economies are also less important for Section 20 subsidiaries than for investment banks. The factors that determine gross spreads on SEOs are identical across underwriter type, however.
The next section of the paper provides a brief background. Section 3 provides sample information and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the methods and identifies the hypotheses tested in the paper. Section 5 presents empirical results on underwriter compensation in the IPO and SEO markets. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Background
Underwriters provide a set of services to firms seeking to issue equity either as an initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO). The underwriter provides advice and assistance to the issuer on the appropriate structure of financial statements, the preparation of the offering statement, and the size and timing of the issue. The underwriter typically performs a due diligence analysis of the firm and consequently serves a certification role. The underwriter plays a marketing role by accompanying the issuer's senior management on a "road show" to provide information to potential investors and assess the demand for the issue. In particular, the underwriter records investor interests in new shares in a "book". The underwriter prices the shares based on this assessment of demand and its own financial analysis. The underwriter's contractual agreement with the issuer also addresses issues such as an over-allotment option, the lock-up period, and the prospect of price stabilization in the aftermarket. The issuer and the underwriter can alter the registration statement until the day before the issue, and last-minute changes typically involve adjustments to the offer price and/or to the size of the issue. Finally, the underwriter forms a syndicate and distributes the issue to the public.
Academic research has focused on many different aspects in the equity underwriting process, including the relative costs to the issuer, the pricing of new issues, the relevance of the underwriter's "reputation" to cost and pricing issues, the role of "relationship" in equity underwriting, the relevance of the offering method, the role of additional parties such as venture capital firms and law firms, the relevance of underwriter stabilization activities, and the impact of the expiration of the "lock-up period" that prevents designated investors from selling their shares over some specified period. The literature is large and involves diverse results and it is not our objective to present a comprehensive review. We instead provide some grounding for our analysis based on a sampling of the relevant literature.
Underwriters are compensated for providing a variety of services to issuers. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) distinguish among the marketing, monitoring and certification services of underwriters. Marketing services include the preparation of the issue for underwriting and the distribution of the security, typically through a syndication process. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) also categorize risk bearing as a marketing service. Certification services pertain mainly to the pricing of the issue, in particular the assurance that the price is "fair" in the context of the Securities Act of 1933. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) link the set of monitoring services to the arguments of Easterbrook (1984) who contends that dividends can be at least partially explained as a device for eliciting monitoring by an underwriting firm. These monitoring activities are focused primarily on controlling agency costs within the issuing firm and potentially add value to the firm in several ways. The lead underwriter's research can reveal information about managerial effort and the efficiency of existing governance mechanisms. The prospect of such monitoring discourages prerequisite consumption and gives managers enhanced incentives to focus on performance. The underwriter also can make more information available about the firm's overall strategy and its relationship to the management's human capital and level of effort.
Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) find evidence that gross spreads on SEOs decline when there is less demand for agency-related monitoring. While Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) were primarily seeking evidence to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that monitoring was a valuable service provided by underwriters along with marketing and certification, our motivation is somewhat different. Our objective is to investigate whether Section 20 underwriters and traditional investment banks bring different sets of marketing, monitoring, and certification capabilities to the market. We do so by trying to determine whether there are fundamental differences in the factors driving their underwriting compensation. Kanatas and Qi (1998) analyze the potential for information-based scope economies associated with securities underwriting by commercial bank-affiliated firms. Information gathered in the process of loan evaluation may be equally useful in the underwriting process.
They contrast this potential benefit to firms raising funds with the prospect of additional costs in the form of conflicts of interest. Banks that uncover negative information in the lending process have an incentive to misrepresent the borrower's quality when underwriting their securities since the proceeds could be used to liquidate the bank's loan. Kanatas and Qi (1998) demonstrate how reputational concerns can resolve this trade-off in a way that mitigates the conflict-of-interest problem. Puri (1996) observes results that are consistent with a certification role for bank-related underwritings in the pre-Glass Steagall period and inconsistent with the conflict-of-interest hypothesis. Gande et al. (1997) (2000) find that issuance fees on debt are systematically lower at commercial bank-affiliated underwriters than at investment banks over period 1995 -1998 , and that neither the existence nor size of a prior loan relationship is critical to the result.
There are a number of additional reasons why commercial bank-affiliated underwriters might perform differently than traditional investment banks. First, as "new" entrants into the business, Section 20 firms could have an incentive to offer pricing discounts. James (1992) argues that underwriting debt or equity securities occurs in the context of an ongoing relationship. In particular, the information gained in the underwriting process can be re-used in subsequent transactions. An underwriter gains a "durable transactor-specific asset" in the sense of Williamson (1979) that reflects either issuer-specific information or the development of a Since commercial bank organizations have been identified as "certifiers" in both a lending [Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) ] and debt underwriting context [Gande et al. (1997) ], certification by third-parties such as venture-capital firms may be less relevant in the case of commercial bank-related equity underwriters. We test this hypothesis in our estimations.
The role of the "reputation" of the underwriter is another area of equity underwriting research, but again findings vary across studies. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that gross equity underwriting spreads are negatively related to the size of IPO issues. Gande et al. (1999) also report that the relationship between issue size and gross spreads is negative and significant for all equity issues. We include the amount issued as a variable in our model and test for differences between Section 20 and investment bank underwriters in scale economies. Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) present results
that support a U-shaped curve for SEO and straight-bond issues underwriter spreads, suggesting there are diseconomies of scale for "large" issues due to the increased costs of syndicate services.
The authors find that up to 85% of the underwriting spread is variable and that marginal spreads beyond some level of new capital raised begin to rise. The underwriting technologies of investment banks and Section 20 subsidiaries could differ, however.
Chen and Ritter (2000) provide strong evidence of a relatively invariant seven percent gross spread on IPOs over our sample period, which they interpret as consistent with implicit collusion among underwriters. Hansen (2000) argues that the IPO underwriting market is competitive, despite the prevalence of 7 percent spreads. He suggests that underwriters compete on other dimensions, including reputation, placement services, and underpricing. Our analysis determines whether these dimensions differ systematically between the two types of underwriters in terms of their impact on gross spreads.
Finally, BHCs engaged in underwriting are arguably better diversified than investment banks. The cash flows generated by the large bank holding companies in our sample reflect a substantial variety of lending activities carried out over a wide geographic area. Consequently, Section 20 affiliates may offer discounts on gross spreads based on an overall lower risk profile or their enhanced capacity to offer cross subsidies, given their extensive product set.
Data and preliminary analysis
Information about equity underwritings was obtained from the Securities Data Corporation, Inc. (SDC) database of initial and seasoned issues of new equity securities. The database is constructed from regulatory filings, news sources, company press releases, and prospectuses. This database has been used extensively in underwriting research involving equity and debt. The sample consists of all equity issues for the period January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1999. The initial date is the year in when the equity market share of Section 20 underwriters first exceeded 5 percent.
Sample selection
There were 6,255 equity issues in the SDC database over the sample period, consisting of 3,059 IPOs and 3,196 SEOs. We eliminate 1,205 issues that were closed-end fund investments, mutual fund conversion shares, REITs, spin-offs, or something other than ordinary common stock. Six hundred and sixty-six issues are missing either gross spread or one of the independent variables used in the models. Finally, 101 issues are eliminated that have an offer price less than the "penny stock" threshold of $5. Seguin and Smoller (1997) identify these firms as "especially risky." The final sample contains 4,283 issues, consisting of 2,069 IPOs and 2,214 SEOs.
Market share analysis and tests for differences in means
After the Fed relaxed revenue limits and firewall restrictions on underwriting in late 1996, equity underwriting by Section 20 firms increased substantially. Figure Table 2 , we present the Herfindahl index as a measure of the structure of the equity underwriting market during the sample period. During this period of increased Section 20 equity underwriting, market concentration was increasing. 5 The Herfindahl index value increased from 676 in 1995 to 1102 in 1999. To determine whether our sample selection and its specific mix of 5 Gande et al. (1999) found that increased Section 20 activity had a pro-competitive effect in the debt market over the period 1985 through 1996. They found that the Herfindahl index decreased from 1506 in 1986 to 1175 in 1996.
However, Roten and Mullineaux (2000) found that the Herfindahl index increased in the debt market from 1995 to 1998.
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IPOs and SEOs influences the results, we also calculate the Herfindahl index for all issues during the sample period. The full sample results are consistent with our sub-sample findings. Sample means for the characteristics of the IPOs and issuing firms are presented in Table   3 and the data is disaggregated by type of underwriter. A standard p-value indicates where there are statistical differences in means between Section 20 and non-Section 20 underwriters.
IPOs
Average gross spreads on IPOs are significantly lower (6.96% versus 7.24%) for the Section 20 issues with an offer price below the low file range do not differ significantly for either the original (25% versus 21%) or amended (14% versus 14%) file ranges compared to those of investment banks.
Disaggregated IPO Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we examine whether Section 20 subsidiaries rely more or less heavily than investment banks on the 7 percent gross spreads that have become quite prevalent in the 1990s.
We disaggregate the IPO sample into three issue size ranges: under $20 million, $20 -80 million, and over $80 million. We present descriptive statistics identifying the proportion of issues with 7 percent gross spreads, the mean gross spread, offer price, issue proceeds, and issuer market value for each of the sub-samples. The proportion of issues in the entire sample with a seven percent gross spread is significantly higher for Section 20 issues (93% versus 69%) than for investment banks. The average offer price is also significantly higher for Section 20 issues ($12.97 versus $12.35) . 6 We also calculated the proportion of issues where the high file price was amended. Section 20 and non-Section 20 underwriters amended the high file price in approximately 25% of the IPOs in the sample.
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Descriptive statistics for small issues (less than $20 million) are presented in Table 4 , Panel B. The proportion of 7 percent issues is significantly larger for Section 20 underwriters (99% versus 92%). However, the average gross spreads do not differ between Section 20 subsidiaries and investment bank underwriters in the sub-sample. Section 20 underwritings have significantly larger (at the .10 level) issue size ($43 versus $41 million), while the market value of issuing firms is lower for Section 20 underwritings, but insignificantly so.
Descriptive statistics for large issues (greater than $80 million) are presented in Table 4 , Panel C. The average gross spread is significantly larger for Section 20 issues (6.76% versus 6.57%). The 7 percent issues are proportionately much lower for both Section 20 and investment bank underwriters (58% and 48%) compared to the smaller-size sub-samples, but the difference across underwriter type is not significant. The offer price associated with the different types of underwriter is identical ($18). The issue size and the market value of the firm are smaller for Section 20 offerings, but the differences are not significant.
In sum, there are significant differences in the prevalence of seven percent gross spreads between the two underwriter types. Section 20 underwriters establish a seven percent gross spread for virtually all issues (289 out of 292) in the small and medium issue size range. Smallfirm issuers benefit from the prevalence of seven percent gross spreads in Section 20 underwritings, since the average gross spread established by investment banks for this class (8.23%) is significantly higher. The fact that commercial bank-affiliated underwriters are highly likely to maintain 7 percent spreads for relatively small issues while investment banks charge higher spreads can be viewed as rough evidence of Hansen's (2000) claim that underwriters compete on multiple dimensions. Section 20s presumably possess advantages in dealing with smaller firms that investment banks lack, such as superior monitoring capabilities or lower information costs, which could rationalize the smaller spreads and higher prices on their new issues. Our finding here is consistent with that of Gande et al., who found that Section 20 underwriters established lower spreads on debt issues of smaller, riskier firms. Unfortunately, the lack of variability in the small issue spreads precludes any hypothesis testing. The large-issue sample has a greater proportion of gross spreads not equal to seven percent and provides a subsample for testing the robustness of the full sample results presented below.
SEOs
SEO descriptive statistics are presented in The percent of the issues that were amended is 65% for Section 20 underwriters and 70%
for non-Section 20 underwriters, and the difference is significant. 7 The percentage of issues with an offer price above the original high file price, a proxy measure for pricing performance, is higher for Section 20 than investment bank underwritings (42% versus 40%), but the difference is insignificant. The percentage of issues with an offer price above the amended high file price is identical for the two types of underwriters (20%). Section 20 issues with an offer price below the low file range do not significantly differ for either the original (55% versus 56%) or amended (76% versus 76%) file ranges.
Methods and hypotheses
We next estimate a set of models with the objective of testing for differences in the factors influencing the costs of equity underwriting at commercial bank-affiliated firms and investment banks. Our gross spread model includes variables that capture the certification, marketing, and monitoring roles of underwriters emphasized by Hansen and Torregrosa (1992), 7 The high file price for the SEO issues was amended approximately 26% of the time for both the Section 20 and non-Section 20 underwriters.
although our specification is more detailed than theirs. We also include several variables that explicitly reflect the entry of Section 20 subsidiaries into the equity underwriting market. Section 20 subsidiaries may be expected to underwrite equity at lower costs than investment banks for a number of reasons, including the prospect that the former have access to superior information about the issuer, possess a more efficient information processing technology, and/or are better able to identify and control agency costs associated with the issuing firm. Section 20 subsidiaries and their customers may also benefit from activity and asset diversification within the typical large BHC.
Multivariate analysis of gross spread
We estimate the models using OLS regression analysis, with Newey-West heteroscedastic consistent p-values to adjust for understated standard errors. 8 The gross spread variable is calculated as offer size less proceeds to the issuer expressed as a percentage of the issue size. The gross or underwriter spread is shared among lead managers, co-managers, and the syndicate group and includes the management fee (portion payable to the book manager), the underwriting fee (portion payable to co-managers), the selling concession (portion payable to the selling syndicate) and the reallowance fee (fee paid to secondary sellers of the securities). Underwriting cost functions are likely to be U-shaped, according to their model, because variable underwriting costs such as marketing, monitoring and certification expenses are substantially larger than fixed costs, which are confined primarily to the registration phase of a security issue.
Our specification allows for a non-linear relationship, and it permits the shape of the function to differ between investment banks and commercial bank-affiliated underwriters. Production characteristics could differ between the two types of underwriters, especially since BHCs are relatively new entrants into underwriting. 10 In addition, the mix of expenses associated with monitoring, marketing, and certification could differ between underwriter types. While we hypothesize that the coefficient of PROCEEDS will be positive and the coefficient of LN(PROCEEDS) will be negative (consistent with a U-shaped relation), the individual coefficients could differ between Section 20 and non-Section 20 underwriters. If this is the case, it implies the minimum cost underwriting size differs between the two types of firms.
9 Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) cite a large number of papers and books that present the "received wisdom" of declining underwriting costs.
10 Most of the entry into equity underwriting by BHCs has occurred through acquisitions of existing investment banking firms. Consequently, the production characteristics of Section 20 underwriters may be relatively "mature,"
despite their new entry into the business. (1996) . The intuition is that a high-risk firm can signal quality if the underwriter sets a lower offer price, since a lower price generates larger brokerage commissions and increased attention from analysts. James (1992) and Beatty and Welch (1996) find that gross spreads are positively related to the reciprocal of the offer price. 11 We hypothesize that the cost of underwriting at Section 20 firms will be less sensitive to uncertainty either because of information advantages or because BHCs that own underwriters are better diversified than the representative investment bank.
OFFER UNDER/OVER represents two dummy variables with UNDER equal to 1 for any issue with an offer price set lower than the original file range and 0 otherwise and OVER equal to 1 for any issue with an offer price set higher than the original file range and 0 otherwise.
These variables appear in the equations to test for a relationship between the quality of certification services and the cost of the issue. Underwriters might extract rents from issuers when the offer price is set above the file range, as partial payment for enhancing the wealth of the insiders. Puri (1999) cities rent extraction as a likely prospect in commercial bank-related 11 While this variable has been in a number of studies of gross spreads, Hansen (2000) notes that the offer price is established jointly with the gross spread. This implies the potential for endogeneity bias in our results.
underwritings. Underwriters might also reduce gross spreads when offer prices drop below the file range to protect their reputation, offering discounts for lower than expected pricing performance. We hypothesize that underwriter spreads will be higher (lower) when the offer price is above (below) the file range.
VENTURE is a dummy variable that is 1 if the issuer received funding from a venture capitalist prior to the time of the IPO and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that the presence of venture capitalists will decrease the compensation paid to underwriters because venture capitalists help certify the value of a relatively unknown issuer. Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that venture capital-backed issues were associated with lower gross spreads. Venture capital backing may be less relevant at Section 20 underwriters than at investment banks, however, since . This variable appears only in the SEO gross spread model. We expect that gross spreads will be lower for larger firms, which present fewer information problems to investors and consequently can be monitored at relatively low costs.
PERHELD, which appears only in the IPO spread model, is the proportion of the firm not issued to the market, calculated as the total shares after the issue minus shares offered to the market divided by the total shares. The larger the amount held by the firm's insiders, ceteris paribus, the better aligned are the interests of the new owners and the managers. competitive equity underwriting market, the coefficient should be negative.
13
FRBSHIFT is a dummy variable that is 1 for any issue underwritten after the Fed's relaxation of revenue limits and firewalls in 1997Q1 and 0 otherwise. This variable tests for differences in underwriter spreads before and after the Fed's regulatory policy change that allowed Section 20 underwriters to compete more aggressively and/or to share more information between the underwriter and the other components of the BHC. If this change enhanced competition in the market, then the coefficient of this dummy variable should be negative.
Finally, we include a set of ten dummy variables (SIC0, SIC2,…, and SIC9) based on the primary SIC code of the issuer to control for potential industry effects. For example, SIC6 is 1 for a firm with a SIC code beginning with a 6 and 0 otherwise.
13 Roten and Mullineaux (2000) find no support for a pro-competitive effect associated with increasing Section 20 market share in the debt underwriting market over the period 1995 -1998.
Empirical Results

Gross Spreads on IPOs
The results for IPO gross spreads, disaggregated by Section 20 and traditional investment bank underwriters are presented in Table 6 . 14 We observe several significant differences in the estimated coefficients of the Section 20 model estimates compared to the non-Section 20 estimates, and these are primarily related to the variables we have associated with the certification role of underwriters.
15 Table 6 about here
The coefficients of the log of proceeds take the hypothesized negative sign, but we obtain significance only in the investment bank equation. Traditional investment banks appear better able than Section 20 underwriters to exploit economies of scale in underwriting IPOs, since the p-value reveals the difference in the estimated coefficients is highly significant. Unlike Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), we do not find evidence of a U-shaped cost structure for either type of underwriter, but those sets of authors were examining SEOs rather than IPOs. We estimate an SEO model below and find results similar to theirs.
14 We also estimated the model for the aggregate IPO sample, including a Section 20 dummy variable. The coefficient was insignificant, suggesting that the gross spread models do not have different intercepts between underwriter types. 15 Tests for significant differences in the coefficients are calculated within the models using a Section 20 interaction variable. The interaction terms are a Section 20 dummy variable multiplied by every variable in the equation. When the coefficient of a given interaction term is significant, the implication is the factor in question has a different effect on gross spreads at Section 20 underwriters than to investment banks.
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The coefficients of the variables reflecting the certification role of underwriters all differ significantly between the Section 20 model and the investment bank model. The reciprocal of the offer price has the predicted positive impact on gross spreads at investment banks, but the coefficient of this same variable is negative in the Section 20 models. The p-value indicates the coefficients differ significantly. To the extent that this variable proxies for uncertainty, our results indicate that Section 20 underwriters do not raise underwriting fees in response to uncertainty, whereas investment banks do. This result might reflect the fact that BHCs that own Section 20 subsidiaries are arguably better diversified than investment banks. Gross spreads also react differently at the two types of underwriters to offer prices established outside the original file range. When the offering price is below the range indicated in the filing, investment banks charge a lower gross spread, while Section 20 underwriters do not. Perhaps investment banks discount their gross spreads to preserve their reputations in cases where the offer price is likely to fall below the initial range. The fact that the coefficient of REPUTATION is positive and significant at investment banks in our model, but not at Section 20s, is consistent with this interpretation. We also find that when the offer price is established above the file range, investment banks increase their gross spreads. Investment banks appear to extract some rents from issuers in the event of an unexpectedly high offer price, whereas commercial bankaffiliated underwriters do not. Finally, the presence of a venture capitalist is associated with lower gross spreads at investment banks, but higher spreads at Section 20 subsidiaries. The difference in coefficients is again highly significant. While the market appears to value the presence of a third party certifier in the case of investment banks, this is not the case for Section 20 underwritings, perhaps because banks themselves have been widely shown to play a certification role. As noted above, the relevance of reputation also differs significantly between the two types of underwriters. Reputation has a positive and significant impact on gross spreads only in the case of traditional investment banks. This result is consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Beatty and Welch (1996) . However, issuers do not "pay" for reputation in Section 20 underwritings, perhaps reflecting their relatively recent entry into the business or the lack of reputational differences for BHC associated underwriters. The observed differences in the factors affecting gross spreads are strongly consistent with Hansen's (2000) argument that underwriters compete for business on different dimensions.
The variable that is a proxy for the monitoring role of underwriters in controlling agency costs, PERHELD, is insignificant in both models. While this result differs from Hansen (2000) and Torregrosa (1992), they focused exclusively on SEOs. To the extent that our classification of variables accurately captures the various roles of underwriters, certification appears to be the dominant function in the IPO process, perhaps not surprisingly.
16
The variables reflecting the Federal Reserve's actions with respect to Section 20 activities are, for the most part, insignificant. The increasing market share of Section 20 subsidiaries has no significant impact on IPO gross spreads, consistent with the equity market results found by Gande et al. (1999) for the period 1985-1996 and with the findings of Roten and Mullineaux (2000) for the debt market. The entry of commercial bank-affiliated firms into equity underwriting does not yield a pro-competitive effect on gross spreads. The Fed's relaxation of revenue limits and firewalls in first quarter of 1997 also does not have a pro-competitive effect on gross spreads. In fact, the gross spreads are significantly larger for the Section 20 16 We also estimate the model with a price-to-book (book-to-price) variable to test the robustness of the result with respect to alternative proxies for agency problems. The variable(s) is insignificant and does not quantitatively or qualitatively alter the other results.
underwriters after the regulatory changes. Finally, the industry dummies coefficients are almost always insignificant and are not reported in the tables.
We observe a number of differences in coefficients between the two types of underwriters in the gross spread models and find that we can reject the hypothesis that the full vector of coefficients is identical by the Wald test at any conventional level of significance. 17 All of these differences in factors affecting gross spreads appear to be related to the certification role of underwriters. 
Gross spread on SEOs
We estimate similar models for SEO gross spreads disaggregated by underwriter type.
The results are presented in Table 7 . 19 We find no significant differences between Section 20 and investment bank underwriters in the SEO market. We confirm the results of Hansen and 17 The Wald test is sensitive to difference in the scale of each of the dependent variables. Therefore, we place less significance on the results of this test than on the differences in the individual coefficients.
18 Our results could be influenced by the disproportionate share of 7 percent gross spreads between the two types of underwriter (see Table 4 ). Consequently, we performed a robustness check by estimating the models using only "large" issues. In the case of large issues, we do find evidence of a U-shaped cost structure, including (weak) evidence that Section 20 subsidiaries are more likely to be subject to diseconomies of scale. We observe some significant differences in coefficients that are again strictly related to the set of certification variables. One key difference, however, is that gross spreads are higher in the presence of venture capitalists for both types of underwriters. Since our sub-sample issuers are large firms, certification by a third-party is presumably less relevant to equity purchasers. The coefficient is positive and significant for both underwriter types, suggesting that venturecapitalist backed issues may be more costly to market in the case of larger firms .
19 In a separate estimation, the coefficient of an intercept dummy reveals that SEO gross spreads again do not differ between Section 20 subsidiaries and investment banks. Torregrosa (1992) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) concerning a U-shaped cost structure, but the cost functions do not differ between underwriter types. We also find, like Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) , evidence of a monitoring role for underwriters in the SEO market as reflected in the negative coefficient of the size of the issuer (MKTVAL), and the effect is identical across underwriters. Reputation is negatively related to SEO underwriting spreads and uncertainty
(1/OFFER) is positively related to SEO underwriting spreads. The hypothesis that the vector of coefficients is identical cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Table 7 about here
In sum, the evidence suggests that SEO gross spreads are not determined by different processes at investment banks and Section 20 subsidiaries. Since these firms are relatively well known in the market, commercial bank-affiliated firms appear unable to exploit any informationbased advantages in placing seasoned issues.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper focuses on relative equity issue costs at commercial bank-affiliated and investment bank underwriters over the period 1995-99. We estimate models for the gross spreads associated with both IPOs and SEOs, but disaggregate the sample by type of underwriter. Our methods are driven by theoretical arguments such as Puri (1999) and Kanatas and Qi (1998) that bank-related underwriters could have certain competitive advantages relative to investment banks. We find some distinctive differences among the factors influencing gross spreads at commercial bank-affiliated underwriters relative to investment banks, primarily in the set of variables we identify with the certification role of underwriters.
In the case of IPO gross spreads, we find that variables reflecting third-party monitoring, reputation, pricing procedures, and uncertainty differ significantly between Section 20 and investment bank underwriters. Underwriter reputation affects gross spreads only at investment banks and the impact of venture capitalists on underwriting spreads differs in sign between the two types of underwriters. The certification role typically identified in the literature with the presence of venture capitalists is relevant only for investment banks. Underwriter spreads also are significantly less responsive to price adjustments in the course of the offerings at Section 20 firms. We also find stronger evidence of scale economies in investment bank IPO underwriting.
In the case of SEO gross spreads, the findings suggest that larger participants in the market are associated with lower gross spreads, and we find no significant differences between underwriter types. We find evidence of an identical U-shaped cost function, consistent with Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) , for both types of underwriters.
In sum, different factors influence IPO gross spreads at the two types of underwriters.
The differences are consistent with theories that suggest that commercial bank organizations possess unique technologies for managing information and that Section 20 firms can exploit diversification benefits from BHC affiliation. This interpretation is strengthened by the lack of significant differences in SEO underwriter spreads. Any relative advantage that Section 20s possess in monitoring capabilities or technologies for managing information problems appears to be irrelevant when information is readily and cheaply available. Finally, evidence of differential drivers of gross spreads between Section 20 firms and traditional investment banks supports Hansen's (2000) view that underwriters compete for business on different dimensions. Gross spread is the underwriting spread expressed as a percentage of the principal amount offered. The Market Value is the size of the firm prior to the issue (millions of dollars). Proceeds is the principal size of the issue (millions of dollars). Venture is the proportion of issuer backed by venture capitalist at the time of the initial public offering. Amended is the proportion of issues that were amended prior to the offering. PERHELD is the percent of the firm not issued to the market (Total shares after the issue minus shares offered to the market divided by the total shares). Offer below original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price below the original lowest price in the file range. Offer above original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price above the original highest price in the file range. Offer below original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price below the original lowest price in the file range. Offer above original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price above the original highest price in the file range. p-values are presented for significance levels using a two-tailed test.
IPOs: (N=2069)
Section 20s 
Table 5 SEO Descriptive Statistics: Means and Sample Proportions
Gross spread is the total underwriting spread expressed as a percentage of the principal amount offered. The Market Value is the size of the firm prior to the issue (millions of dollars). Proceeds is the principal size of the issue (millions of dollars). Venture is the proportion of issuer backed by venture capitalist at the time of the initial public offering. Amended is the proportion of issues that were amended prior to the offering. Offer below original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price below the original lowest price in the file range. Offer above original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price above the original highest price in the file range. Offer below original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price below the original lowest price in the file range. Offer above original low file is the proportion of issues that have an offer price above the original highest price in the file range. p-values are presented for significance levels using a two-tailed test.
SEOs: (N=2214)
Section 20s GROSS SPREAD = β 0 + β 1 LN (PROCEEDS) + β 2 PROCEEDS + β 3 1/OFFER + β 4 OFFER UNDER + β 5 OFFER OVER + β 6 VENTURE + β 7 PERHELD + β 8 REPUTATION + β 9 MKTSHARE + β 10 FRBSHIFT + β SIC PRIMARY SIC.
LN (PROCEEDS) is the natural log of the principal size of the is sue (millions of dollars). PROCEEDS is the principal size of the issue (millions of dollars). 1 / OFFER is 1 divided by the offer price. OFFER UNDER is a dummy variable that is 1 if the offer price is higher than the original high file price and 0 otherwis e. OFFER OVER is a dummy variable that is 1 if the offer price is lower than the original low file price and 0 otherwise. VENTURE is a dummy variable that is 1 if the issuer was venture-backed at the time of the initial public offering and 0 otherwise. PERHELD is the percent of the firm not issued to the market (total shares after the issue minus shares offered to the market divided by the total shares GROSS SPREAD = β 0 + β 1 LN (PROCEEDS) + β 2 PROCEEDS + β 3 1/OFFER + β 4 LN(MKTVAL) + β 5 REPUTATION + β 6 MKTSHARE + β 7 FRBSHIFT + β SIC PRIMARY SIC. LN (PROCEEDS) is the natural log of the principal size of the issue (millions of dollars). PROCEEDS is the principal size of the issue (millions of dollars). 1 / OFFER is 1 divided by the offer price. LN (MKTVAL) is the natural log of the pre-issue market value of the firm based on offer price (millions of dollars). REPUTATION is a dummy variable equal to 1 for issues underwritten by Goldman Sachs & Co, Merrill Lynch & Co Inc., Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (Morgan Stanley), Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, CS First Boston, Salomon Smith Barney (Smith Barney Inc., Smith Barney Shearson, Smith Barney, Salomon Brothers), and Lehman Brothers, which are the top producers in the sample, and 0 otherwise. MKTSHARE is the market share of all Section 20 subsidiaries for each year in the sample. FRBSHIFT is a dummy variable that is 1 for any issue underwritten after the Fed's relaxation of revenue limits and firewalls in 1997Q1 and 0 otherwise. SIC is a set of ten dummy variables (SIC0, SIC2,…, and SIC9) based on the primary SIC code of the issuer. For example, SIC6 is 1 for a firm with a SIC code beginning with a 6 and 0 otherwise. The results for the SIC variables are excluded for presentation purposes, available upon request. p-values are presented for significance levels using a two-tailed test. 
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